What Does Creativity Have to Do With Memory

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Creativity and Retentivity: Effects of an Episodic Specificity Induction on Divergent Thinking

Kevin P. Madore

^oneHarvard Academy, Department of Psychology and Center for Encephalon Science

Donna Rose Addis

^twoThe University of Auckland, Schoolhouse of Psychology and Middle for Brain Research

Daniel L. Schacter

¹Harvard University, Section of Psychology and Center for Brain Science

Abstract

After receiving an episodic specificity consecration - brief preparation in recollecting details of a contempo event - people produce more episodic details when imagining futurity events and solving means-stop problems than afterwards receiving a command induction not focused on episodic retrieval. Here we show for the first time that an episodic specificity induction also enhances divergent creative thinking. In Experiment 1, participants exhibited a selective boost on a divergent thinking chore that involves generating unusual uses of mutual objects subsequently a specificity induction compared with a control induction; past contrast, operation was similar on an object clan task thought to involve little divergent thinking. In Experiment 2, we replicated the specificity induction result on divergent thinking using a different control induction, and also institute that participants performed similarly on a convergent thinking chore following both inductions. These experiments provide novel evidence that episodic retention is involved in divergent creative thinking.

Keywords: episodic specificity induction, episodic retention, creativity, divergent thinking, convergent thinking, imagination

Episodic memory is typically thought of every bit a neurocognitive system that supports the ability to recollect specific personal experiences that happened in a item fourth dimension and identify (Tulving, 1983, 2002). However, it has become clear that episodic memory also plays an of import role in a variety of tasks and functions that do not require recollection of specific by personal experiences. For example, Tulving (2002) argued that episodic memory supports "mental time travel" into the future as well as the past, and indeed numerous recent studies have provided bear witness that episodic memory contributes chiefly to imagining or simulating possible future experiences (for recent reviews, see Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012; Szpunar, 2010). In a related vein, recent studies indicate that episodic retentiveness contributes to solving open-ended or means-end issues that involve hypothetical social situations: more effective solutions to means-end problems are characterized by more episodic detail (Madore & Schacter, 2014; Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011).

The starting point for the nowadays investigation comes from evidence suggesting that episodic retentivity may besides contribute to aspects of creative thinking. For instance, Duff, Kurzcek, Rubin, Cohen, and Tranel (2013) written report that amnesic patients suffering from bilateral hippocampal damage, who exhibit severe impairments of episodic retentiveness, also exhibit impairments on a widely used bombardment of creativity tasks, the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. Consequent with these findings, recent fMRI evidence (Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012) has revealed that brain regions typically associated with episodic memory, including the hippocampus, show increased activity when participants generate creative ideas while designing book cover illustrations. Benedek et al. (2014) obtained similar results when participants performed a task that requires generating culling uses for mutual objects (the Alternate Uses Chore or AUT; Guilford, 1967), which is idea to tap a key component of inventiveness known as divergent thinking – the capacity to generate creative ideas by combining diverse types of information in novel means. Along these lines, Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) reported that participants sometimes depict on specific past experiences when performing the AUT, and Addis, Pan, Musicaro, and Schacter (2014) found that performance on the AUT is positively correlated with the amount of episodic particular that young and older adults generate when they imagine scenarios that might occur in their personal futures.

While the foregoing studies all suggest a link between episodic retention and inventiveness, the evidence is subject to various caveats and qualifications. Amnesic patients with hippocampal damage typically exhibit deficits in forming both new episodic and new semantic memories (i.e., impaired declarative memory; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004), so it is unclear whether inventiveness deficits in such patients specifically implicate episodic retention. Bear witness for activation in the hippocampus and related structures during creative idea generation and divergent thinking (Benedek et al., 2014; Ellamil et al., 2012) is consistent with a office for episodic retentiveness, just does not provide conclusive evidence for it. In Gilhooly et al.'south (2007) study, retrieval of detail episodic memories on the AUT occurred infrequently (i.e., under ten% of the fourth dimension). And although Addis et al. (2014) observed a link between divergent thinking and the corporeality of episodic detail in imagined future scenarios, no such link was observed betwixt divergent thinking and the amount of episodic detail in imagined or recalled past events.

To assess more straight the possible contribution of episodic retention to specific forms of creativity, in the present experiments we take a novel arroyo involving the use of what we have called an episodic specificity induction: cursory training in recollecting details of contempo experiences (Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2014, 2015). The logic of our arroyo is straightforward: if a cognitive task relies on episodic memory, then functioning on that task should be affected by an episodic specificity induction given prior to the chore. Past contrast, if performance on a cerebral task does non rely on episodic memory, so task performance should not be influenced past an episodic specificity induction given prior to the chore. Adopting this logic, we take previously shown that compared with control inductions, an episodic specificity induction given prior to split tasks that require remembering by experiences, imagining time to come experiences, or describing a pictorial scene selectively boosts the number of episodic details that participants generate when they think the past and imagine the future, while having no outcome on the number of semantic details generated and no effect at all on the number of details generated when describing a picture (Madore et al., 2014) or generating give-and-take definitions and comparisons (Madore & Schacter, 2015). We have as well shown that an episodic specificity consecration has beneficial effects on a ways-end social trouble-solving task (Platt & Spivack, 1975): after receiving the specificity induction, participants generated more relevant solution steps than they did following a control consecration (Madore & Schacter, 2014). Based on this evidence, we have suggested that the induction could impact the process of episodic retrieval orientation: a flexible, goal-directed strategy for retrieving an episode in a more than or less specific way when presented with a cue (Morcom & Rugg, 2012). In the series of experiments beneath, we examination whether biasing a specific retrieval orientation affects divergent thinking.

More specifically, in Experiment 1, we test and provide evidence for the hypothesis that functioning on a widely used test of divergent thinking, the AUT, will be enhanced after an episodic specificity induction compared with a control induction. We dissociate this upshot from performance on a semantic object association chore that also required generative responses but places less demand on divergent thinking than does the AUT (Abraham et al., 2012). Experiment 2 attempts to replicate this upshot and examine whether the beneficial effects of the specificity induction extend to a task that taps a class of inventiveness known every bit convergent thinking – the ability to generate the best single solution to a specific trouble (Guilford, 1967). In both experiments we also included an imagination task that nosotros accept previously shown to be afflicted by the specificity induction (Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2014, 2015) as a manipulation check to ensure that the specificity induction was operating as expected in the nowadays study.

Experiment 1 Method

Participants

Xx-iv young adults (K_age = 22.50 years, SD_age = iii.72 yrs, 15 female person) were recruited via advertisements at Boston Academy and Harvard University. All young adults had normal vision and no history of neurological impairment. They gave informed consent, were treated in accordance with guidelines canonical by the ethics committee at Harvard University, and received pay for completing the written report. We decided prior to the experiment on a sample size of 24 and stopped data drove after reaching this number because in our previous studies with the consecration epitome (e.g., Madore et al., 2014) this sample size has been adequate for detecting at least a medium-sized effect (i.e., d = .threescore) if information technology exists (ability > .80, two-tailed for a within-subjects design). One participant was excluded due to a technical error; thus, our terminal sample consisted of 23 participants.

Overview

Participants came to the lab for two sessions, at to the lowest degree a calendar week autonomously (M = 7.35 days, SD = 1.eleven). In each session, participants ane) watched one of two versions of a short video of a man and adult female performing different activities in a business firm, 2) completed a short filler task and and then were questioned about the video with the episodic specificity induction or control induction, and 3) completed the alternate uses, object association, and imagination tasks. In the second session, participants received whichever video and induction they had not received in the first session, and generated responses for the iii tasks with new cues. The guild of inductions and video-induction pairing was counterbalanced across participants.

Materials

Inductions

Episodic specificity induction

Half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive the episodic specificity induction in the kickoff session (and control induction in the second session). During this induction, participants were asked questions about the specific contents of the video they had seen with unlike probes from the Cognitive Interview, a protocol that boosts the number of accurate details that eyewitnesses recall about an event (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Memon et al., 2010). The goal of the specificity consecration is to help participants recollect an experienced event in an episodically specific way. Participants were offset told that they were the good most the video, and were then guided through three mental imagery probes where they were asked to close their eyes and generate a picture in their mind about the setting, people, and actions they had seen. They were asked to verbalize everything they remembered and to be equally specific equally possible, and were probed for more than detail with open-ended questions nigh elements they had mentioned.

Command induction

The other half of participants were randomly assigned to receive a control induction in the first session (and specificity induction in the second session). During this induction, participants were too asked questions about the contents of the video they had seen. They were first asked to verbalize what their impressions and opinions of the video were, and and then responded to general questions about its setting, people, and actions (eastward.g., adjectives to depict each) and other elements (due east.m., equipment used to make the video). There were no mental imagery probes in this consecration and participants were not asked to focus on or speak near specific details from the video. Nosotros used this as our control because we wanted participants in both inductions to reflect on and speak about the contents of the video they had seen so that an result of the specificity consecration could non be attributed to simply speaking about the video itself. The master departure in inductions was the degree to which participants recalled data in an episodically specific style. Inductions were approximately 5 minutes long (run into Supplemental Materials for total scripts).

Principal tasks

After completing the induction phase in each session, participants typed responses to object cues for the alternate uses, object association, and imagination tasks on a figurer screen. The order of these tasks was blocked (e.chiliad., uses-association-imagination) and randomized beyond participant, induction, and task (every bit was the society of object cues). Seventeen dissimilar object cues appeared in each session. The cues were everyday objects (e.thousand., paper, bed canvas, heart glasses) that are used in the official exam booklet for the AUT (e.g., Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1960) and other studies on divergent thinking. Before completing each task, participants responded to a practice cue to ensure that they understood the instructions and response interface. There were no experimenter questions or inputs during the primary experimental trials. Participants had three minutes to complete each trial, during which a separate object cue appeared on the screen. Instructions before each principal chore also appeared on the screen in front of participants and focused on reporting everything in as much particular every bit possible so that report criteria would be equated following the induction manipulation.

Alternating Uses Task (AUT)

Participants saw 5 unlike object cues (plus one do) and typed as many unusual and creative uses every bit possible for each cue. They were told that while each object cue had a common use, they should generate every bit many other uses equally they could in equally much detail every bit they could (Guilford et al., 1960). The AUT is idea to tap divergent thinking in that participants are asked to flexibly recombine information in novel ways (Guilford, 1967).

Object Clan Task (OAT)

Participants saw 5 different object cues (plus i practice) and typed as many other objects typically associated with the cue as possible (Abraham et al., 2012), in as much detail every bit they could. The chore was used every bit a complement to the AUT so that participants would generate information in response to object cues for the aforementioned amount of time in both conditions. The main departure is that object association is thought to involve divergent thinking or episodic imagery to a lesser degree than the AUT; generating typical semantic associates does not require the aforementioned level of flexible thinking as does generating unusual and creative uses for objects, and behavioral and neural dissociations have previously been found between these ii tasks (Abraham et al., 2012).

Imagination

Participants saw iv unlike object cues (plus one practice) and generated an event (on one 24-hour interval in one place) that could happen to them inside the next few years that somehow incorporated the cue (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008). Participants were told to imagine a novel event from a field perspective. They were asked to blazon everything they could imagine (e.thou., people, actions) nigh the event in as much detail as possible. Given previous findings of a robust effect of the episodic specificity induction on the imagination task (Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2014, 2015), it was included to ensure that the specificity manipulation operated as expected.

Scoring

Participants' responses were scored by one of ii raters who were blind to which consecration had been received and to all experimental hypotheses. For the AUT, we focused on the number of categories of appropriate uses since appropriateness is the near stringent definition of a use (modified from Addis et al., 2014; Guilford, 1967; Guilford et al., 1960). Advisable, or feasible and possible uses, are amassed into distinct categories (e.k., using a safety pivot for earrings and for a bracelet charm are both advisable uses that fall under one category of jewelry; using a shoe to concur an developed and to concur a big-screen television are both inappropriate uses and would not exist scored); the number of categories of appropriate uses was summed across cues for each participant. Before scoring the experimental trials, raters separately scored responses from x cues along these dimensions with high inter-rater reliability (Cronbach'south α = .92). Other standard dimensions of AUT use generation were also scored (run into Supplemental Materials). For the OAT, raters identified objects and excluded other words (east.chiliad., for sock, an object could be washing machine; non-object responses such as dirty were excluded) to ensure consistency with previous work and task instructions (Abraham et al., 2012); the number of objects was summed beyond cues for each participant. Before scoring the experimental trials, raters separately scored responses from 10 cues for objects with high inter-rater reliability (Cronbach's α = .98). For imagination, we focused on internal and external details (Levine et al., 2002). Internal details – or episodic details – are whatever bits of information (e.g., people, setting, actions, feelings, objects, etc.) that are tied to the central result. External details – or primarily semantic details – are typically any bits of information (e.g., facts, commentary, etc.) that are not-episodic. The average number of internal and external details beyond events was computed for each participant. Before scoring the experimental trials, raters separately scored responses from 12 cues forth these dimensions with high inter-rater reliability (Cronbach's αs ≥ .92).

Experiment ane Results

To assess whether the specificity induction had the same effects equally in previous research, we examined performance on the imagination job with a ii (Consecration: control vs. specificity) ten 2 (Detail blazon: internal vs. external) repeated-measures ANOVA. Five responses were excluded (2.71% of full) for not falling in the next few years (results were the same when the trials were included). We found no main result of Induction, F(1, 22) = 0.95, p > .250, η_p ² = .04, a master effect of Particular blazon, F(1, 22) = 53.46, p < .001, η_p ² = .71, and most critically, an interaction between Induction and Detail type, F(1, 22) = 9.30, p = .006, η_p ² = .xxx. Participants generated more internal details (1000_command = 26.12, SE = 2.87; M_specificity = 30.30, SE = 2.79), and fewer external details (M_command = 5.81, SE = one.43; M_specificity = 3.44, SE = ane.01) subsequently the specificity induction than the control, smallest t(22) = −two.23, p = .036, mean divergence = −2.37, 95% CI = [−4.58, −0.16], d = 0.46. These results closely replicate our previous findings (eastward.yard., Madore & Schacter, 2014) and thus bespeak that the specificity induction operated every bit expected.

To address our main hypothesis – that the episodic specificity induction would enhance functioning on the AUT to a greater extent than on the OAT – we conducted some other two (Induction: control vs. specificity) x 2 (Job: OAT vs. AUT) repeated-measures ANOVA. At that place was no main event of Induction, F(1, 22) = 0.51, p > .250, η_p ⁱⁱ = .02), a principal upshot of Task, F(1, 22) = 37.77, p < .001, η_p ² = .63, and virtually critically, an interaction betwixt Induction and Job, F(1, 22) = vii.18, p = .014, η_p ² = .25. Participants generated more than categories of appropriate uses when they received the specificity consecration (M = 34.48, SE = 3.55) compared with the control induction (Thou = 28.57, SE = ii.72), t(22) = 2.49, p = .021, mean difference = 5.91, 95% CI = [0.98, 10.85], d = 0.52. By contrast, participants generated a similar number of objects following both inductions (1000_control = 52.83, SE = 4.49; M_specificity = 49.83, SE = 5.19), t(22) = −1.05, p > .250, mean difference = −iii.00, 95% CI = [−eight.93, 2.93], d = 0.22. Figure 1 depicts the hateful difference score for each task. Nosotros found the aforementioned selective boost from the specificity induction when we examined other standard dimensions of AUT use generation: full uses, advisable uses alone, and categories of all uses (run into Supplemental Materials). Figure 1.

Mean departure for each output variable every bit a function of induction. Error confined stand for 95% confidence interval on each mean departure. A greater positive divergence reflects a boost with the specificity induction.

Experiment 1 Give-and-take

The results of Experiment one bear witness clearly that an episodic specificity induction significantly boosted performance on a task that involves divergent thinking, the AUT, while having piffling result on an object association chore that is thought to involve piddling divergent thinking (Abraham et al., 2012). The specificity induction also produced very like effects as observed in our previous studies (Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2014, 2015) on an imagination task, boosting the number of episodic but not semantic details that participants generated when they imagined possible future events. The parallel furnishings of the specificity consecration on divergent thinking and imagination provide novel back up for the idea that both draw importantly on episodic retrieval, consistent with previous findings and ideas about artistic noesis (Addis et al., 2014; Benedek et al., 2014; Ellamil et al., 2012; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Gilhooly et al., 2007; Smith, 1995; Smith & Ward, 2012), and to our knowledge the first testify that an experimental manipulation that specifically increases episodic retrieval too increases a measure of artistic thinking (for an example of related evidence, run across Storm & Patel, 2014).

In Experiment 2, we addressed three issues raised past Experiment i. First, we attempted to make up one's mind whether we could replicate the effects of the specificity induction on the AUT. 2d, we examined whether the effect of the specificity induction versus the control consecration on the AUT reflects an increase relative to baseline produced by the specificity induction or a decrease relative to baseline produced by the control induction. The latter induction emphasizes full general impressions and thoughts, which conceivably could have suppressed divergent thinking below the levels that would accept been attained following a more than neutral baseline (run into Koutstaal & Cavendish, 2006; Rudoy, Weintraub, & Paller, 2009, for related bear witness of retrieval orientation manipulations). To address the consequence, we replaced the impressions control with a chore that involved completing math problems. Nosotros have previously found similar effects of the specificity induction on memory and imagination compared with the impressions control and math problems control (Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2015), and expected to find the same effect on the AUT. Third, we asked whether the effects of the specificity induction are selective to divergent thinking, or whether they also extend to the component of inventiveness known as convergent thinking, which as noted before is the ability to generate the all-time single solution to a specific problem (Guilford, 1967). To address this issue, we used the Remote Associates Test (RAT; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; Mednick, 1962), which is a standard measure of convergent thinking.

Experiment 2 Method

Participants

Twenty-four immature adults (M_age = 20.75 years, SD_age = 2.69 yrs, fourteen female) were run in the study with the same recruitment and information collection parameters every bit in Experiment ane. Participants received pay or class credit for the study. One participant was excluded due to job noncompliance; thus, our concluding sample consisted of 23 participants.

Overview and Materials

Participants again came to the lab for two sessions, at to the lowest degree a calendar week apart (M = 7.30 days, SD = 1.46). The design parameters and stimuli were exactly the same in Experiment 2 equally in Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, the impressions control induction was replaced with a math packet control consecration (as in Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2015). In this condition, later on watching the video and completing the filler job, participants worked on math problems rather than speak nigh the video's contents. This command status does not explicitly call for episodic retrieval of any kind and should be a more than neutral baseline than the impressions control. Inductions were approximately 5 minutes long.

Second, the OAT was replaced with the RAT, a standard measure of convergent thinking. Participants saw thirty different triads (plus one practice), with each triad consisting of three main words, and were asked to generate a solution give-and-take that formed a mutual discussion/phrase with each of the three master parts of the triad (e.g., for "Eight/Skate/Stick" the solution word would be "Figure"). Participants had xxx seconds to generate the solution word for each triad, so that equal time would be spent completing the experimental trials for this job and the AUT. Participants viewed 30 different triads in the 2d session (plus ane practice). Triads were randomized beyond participant and induction. We chose 62 triads from Bowden and Jung-Beeman's (2003) normative list that between 0–46% of individuals could solve in thirty seconds to avoid floor or ceiling effects (based on these normative data, success percentages were approximately 27% in both inductions).

Scoring

Participants' responses were again scored past one of two raters blind to induction and to all experimental hypotheses. For the AUT, we focused again on categories of advisable uses (Cronbach's α = .95) and for imagination, internal and external details (Cronbach'due south αs ≥ .92). Inter-rater reliability was not calculated for RAT solution words since we just summed the number of right responses beyond all trials for a participant. Scoring and results for other dimensions of AUT employ generation announced in Supplemental Materials; we replicated these induction effects from Experiment i.

Experiment ii Results

As in Experiment i, nosotros also replicated our outcome for imagination as a manipulation check with a ii (Induction: control vs. specificity) x 2 (Item type: internal vs. external) repeated-measures ANOVA. Two responses (1.09% of total) were excluded for not falling in the next few years (results were the aforementioned when these trials were included). There was no chief effect of Consecration, F(1, 22) = 1.41, p = .247, η_p ² = .06, a main upshot of Particular blazon, F(1, 22) = 75.24, p < .001, η_p ² = .77, and an interaction betwixt Induction and Detail type, F(one, 22) = 12.01, p = .002, η_p ² = .35. Participants generated more internal details (One thousand_control = 26.84, SE = ii.55; M_specificity = 32.86, SE = iii.04), and fewer external details (Thousand_control = 9.21, SE = 1.43; Grand_specificity = five.09, SE = ane.65), after the specificity induction than the command, smallest t(22) = two.95, p = .007, hateful difference = 6.02, 95% CI = [1.79, 10.25], d = 0.62.

For our principal analysis, we conducted another 2 (Induction: control vs. specificity) x 2 (Job: RAT vs. AUT) repeated-measures ANOVA to examine whether 1) the specificity induction effect on apply generation from Experiment one replicates, and 2) whether this effect extends to the RAT. As in Experiment one, we plant a selective boost on the AUT from the specificity induction.

There were main furnishings of Consecration, F(1, 22) = 12.42, p = .002, η_p ⁱⁱ = .36, and Chore, F(1, 22) = 80.54, p < .001, η_p ² = .79, and a marginal interaction between Induction and Task, F(1, 22) = 4.26, p = .051, η_p ² = .16. Participants generated more categories of appropriate uses when they received the specificity consecration (Grand = 26.57, SE = ane.96) compared with the control (G = 23.09, SE = 2.05), t(22) = 3.67, p = .001, hateful divergence = iii.48, 95% CI = [1.51, 5.45], d = 0.77. Participants generated non-significantly more than correct solution words on the RAT following the specificity than command induction (G_control = vi.91, SE = 0.77; M_specificity = 7.83, SE = 0.76), t(22) = 1.thirteen, p > .250, mean divergence = 0.91, 95% CI = [−0.76, 2.58], d = 0.24. Figure 2 depicts the hateful difference score for each task.

Mean divergence for each output variable as a function of consecration. Fault bars represent 95% conviction interval on each mean departure. A greater positive difference reflects a boost with the specificity induction.

Full general Discussion

The two experiments reported hither provide clear and consistent evidence that an episodic specificity induction that increases the number of episodic details on a future imagining task as well boosts performance on the AUT, a archetype exam of divergent thinking. In both experiments, the most stringent output measure on the divergent thinking task – categories of appropriate uses – showed a meaning increase following the specificity induction compared with the control induction. We observed similar effects of the specificity induction compared with the impressions command induction in Experiment i and math problems control in Experiment two, consistent with the thought that our findings reflect an increase above baseline produced by the specificity induction, rather than a decrease produced by a focus on general impressions and thoughts in the impressions induction, which every bit we noted before could conceivably have suppressed divergent thinking beneath the levels that would accept been attained following a more than neutral baseline.

Experiment 1 showed that the effects of the specificity consecration are selective to the divergent thinking task, with no comparable effects observed on an object clan task thought to elicit picayune divergent thinking (Abraham et al., 2012). Experiment 2 suggests that the observed effects do not extend to convergent thinking: we failed to observe reliable effects of the specificity induction on RAT performance. However, some interpretive caution is required on this point, because the Induction 10 Chore interaction was marginal.

Why does the episodic specificity induction boost operation on the AUT? We accept previously argued (e.g., Madore et al., 2014) that because the specificity consecration increases episodic details reported on both memory and imagination tasks, it affects a procedure tapped by both remembering and imagining. As mentioned in the Introduction, one process common to both is episodic retrieval orientation, a flexible, goal-directed strategy invoked when presented with a retrieval cue (Morcom & Rugg, 2012). Biasing a specific retrieval orientation – that is, retrieval cue processing that focuses on episodic details related to places, people, or deportment – may impact subsequent retentivity, imagination, and divergent thinking because these tasks all involve creating mental scenarios that contain details like those emphasized during the specificity consecration. By dissimilarity, the OAT and RAT tasks focus more than on generating semantic information, and hence show little effect of the specificity induction.

An interesting question concerns whether adopting a specific retrieval orientation enables participants to retrieve more past episodes that involve alternate uses of objects, more than readily call up and recombine episodic details that back up amalgam entirely new uses of objects, or both. Using a procedure in which participants label uses on the AUT as "old" or "new" ideas, other researchers (Benedek et al., 2014; Gilhooly et al., 2007) take argued that new ideas arise from recombining semantic information and imagery. We collected preliminary data suggesting that the specificity induction may heave both "old" and "new" ideas (see Supplemental Materials), but the issue requires more systematic investigation.

More broadly, the touch of episodic specificity on tasks that tap imaginative functions extends beyond divergent thinking. In add-on to furnishings of the episodic specificity induction on imagining future experiences, we recently found that it also increases the number of relevant steps that individuals generate when solving means-terminate issues concerning hypothetical social scenarios (Madore & Schacter, 2014). Future work should use the specificity induction equally a tool to place the contribution of episodic processes to other cognitive tasks that are non normally idea of as "episodic memory tasks", yet nonetheless rely on effective uses of episodic retrieval.

Supplementary Material

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by National Found of Mental Health grant MH060941 and National Institute on Aging grant AG08441 to D.L.Southward.; D.R.A. is supported past a Rutherford Discovery Fellowship (RDF-10-UOA-024). We thank Taiga Abe, Karin Denton, Zoe Galindo, and Kristina Tummino for assistance with various aspects of the study.

Footnotes

Author Contributions

All 3 authors developed the study concept and contributed to the study design. K.P. Madore performed data collection and statistical analyses under supervision of D.R. Addis and D.L. Schacter. One thousand.P. Madore and D.50. Schacter drafted the manuscript, and D.R. Addis provided critical revisions. All three authors canonical the last version of the manuscript for submission.

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4567456/

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